Longreads + Open Thread

Gambling, Context, Media, Fermi Paradox, Intelligence, Endowments, Inequality, Blankfein

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Longreads

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Books

Streetwise: Getting to and Through Goldman Sachs: Lloyd Blankfein worked his way up from gold salesman to CEO of Goldman Sachs just in time for "CEO of Goldman Sachs" to be a hated-by-default figure—his tenure started in 2006, and the company did fine during the financial crisis, so he achieved his peak public attention doing things like testifying before Congress or giving interviews to hostile journalists. And he gave them some great material! In one interview, when he was asked to justify the bank's existence, he rattled off the usual answer—allocating capital to growing businesses that need it makes us all better off—and then brushed the reporter off by saying that Goldman was "doing God's work." In the book, he calls this a "Lloydian slip."

A number of people took this seriously, or at least pretended very hard that they thought he was serious. But if you read the book, you repeatedly get the sense that he's just a generally funny guy who makes jokes when he should know better. At the time that he was born, in the mid-50s, that personality trait would probably preclude someone from having any shot at a successful career working for an investment bank. This book is an autobiography, but it also contains a nice social history of the collapse of one model of American class stratification, by someone whose birth gave him the dual advantage of a chip on his shoulder from some of his early experiences and many opportunities as norms shifted later on.

Blankfein grew up in a public housing project at almost the exact time that "the projects" were getting their current connotation. His parents, a postal clerk and a receptionist, couldn't afford to flee to the suburbs. But Blankfein managed to get ito Harvard, and then Harvard Law. (In a gratifying validation of a very minor Diff observation, Blankfein attended Harvard Law right after the release of The Paper Chase, and says that it seemed to influence not just students but professors, just like wiretaps revealed that mafiosi started talking like Godfather characters after that movie came out. The Diff has argued the same.)

When he graduated, it was still a point in corporate history when Cravaths, Swaines, and Moores did not like to mix much with Proskauers and Roses; he wasn't able to get into one of the big white-shoe firms, but spent a few years doing tax law at Donovan, Leisure. Deciding he didn't particularly enjoy tax law, he jumped to gold sales at J. Aron (even though this is a book about working as a professional trader, the only time he specifically portrays anyone yelling, in all-caps italics, it's his mom when she finds out that he's going to use his Harvard education to be a gold salesman). J. Aron was able to print money without taking meaningful risk when gold trading volume was high, but around the same time Blankfein joined, Goldman acquired them at the peak of that cycle. At that point, Blankfein ended up in another system, stratified by class instead of religious background: the J. Aron traders were scrappy, the Goldman bankers were polished, and each side treated the other like The Other; he mentions a few times that "we" meant "J. Aron," and Goldman was "they." At one point there's a literal Upstairs, Downstairs moment: during the crash of 1987, Blankfein and his fellow currencies and metals traders take the elevator up to the equities trading floor to watch the chaos. They get escorted back down by security.

He joined the trading business right between the era of trader-as-international-spy and the era of trader-as-spreadsheet-jockey, and got to do a bit of both: trips to South Africa to negotiate gold purchases, but also the beginnings of Goldman's SecDB risk-management system. Blankfein built up Goldman's currency-trading business, and gradually expanded both his personal management mandate and the extent to which Goldman was a trading rather than banking business. At one point, when he's expanding the trading business internationally, he engineers the same chip-on-the-shoulder setup he'd experienced: they staffed their Tokyo office with ethnic Koreans.

By the 2000s, Blankfein has been promoted to COO, which he argues is an underrated job ("The CEO is the public face of the company—the one who gets subpoenaed") and then, when his boss gets tapped to be treasury secretary, he makes it to CEO. Just in time to get Goldman's books flat ahead of the financial crisis!

One of the peculiarities of the social responsibility of financiers is: if all of them avoided taking undue risk, we'd have fewer financial crises (and fewer booms, of course). But when a crisis happens, the sloppy CEOs get fired, and so the cautious ones are the only ones who were running banks in the run-up to the collapse and who are still running them after. If you flatten your model down to "banks caused the crisis," without asking which banks contributed what, you'll tend to be maddest at whoever's least at fault. So the arc of the book is the classic one, where someone who's good at a technical or business-management skill crushes every problem in that domain, at which point the only problems left are in unfamiliar fields like politics and PR.

Capital allocation has a brutal form of the Peter Principle. Not only do you get promoted up to your level of incompetence, but you manage the most capital right at the point where whatever strategy you're best at has peaked and gotten overextended. It's not uncommon for people to have good career results in terms of average annualized returns, but to have negative lifetime returns in dollars because their fixed income arbitrage strategy's AUM peaked in 2007 or because they were able to raise so much money to bet on growth equities in 2021. Blankfein managed to avoid that: he was the right manager for taking Goldman's currency trading business from nonexistent to dominant, but also the kind of person paranoid enough to buy credit default swaps from AIG on AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities, and then to buy credit default swaps on AIG, too. That's a rare combination of skills, and the US financial system is more stable for it.

Open Thread

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